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Abstract 
 
The governance of food in Britain has been in a state of flux in recent years.  For over 
a decade, from the mid 1980s to the late 1990s, the then Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food (MAFF) found itself mired in a series of food controversies.  
Eventually, partly overwhelmed by its inability to reassure consumers or the food 
industry on the safety of food in Britain the Ministry was replaced by the Food 
Standards Agency (FSA). In this paper, we briefly review the background to the 
formation of the FSA and its formal role.  We then describe how the creation of the 
FSA has changed the interrelationships between organisations and how these patterns 
have shifted the nature of food governance in Britain.  To analyse the changing nature 
of food governance two models are outlined; one coercive and the other partnership 
based.  An assessment of the extent to which the FSA works with one or other of 
these models is then made by exploring how key FSAs activities, especially its 
approach to enforcement, are shaping its relationships with other organisations and its 
policy outcomes.  The paper draws heavily on material made available by the FSA 
through its website and a set of key person interviews with those with an interest 
along the whole food supply chain. 
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The Food Standards Agency: making a difference?1 
 
Introduction 
 
The governance of food in Britain has been in a state of flux in recent years.  For over 
a decade, from the mid 1980s to the late 1990s, the then Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food (MAFF) found itself mired in a series of food controversies.  
Eventually, partly overwhelmed by its inability to reassure consumers or the food 
industry on the safety of food in Britain the Ministry was replaced by the Food 
Standards Agency (FSA).  In part the creation of the FSA was simply a changing of 
organisational labels since the FSA took over many of the food safety responsibilities 
of MAFF but gained very few additional powers.  However, the changing governance 
of food in Britain is a much more complex story.  The FSA has wanted to make a 
difference to food governance.  At the most obvious level the FSA represents a move 
to a more transparent and inclusive process of governance that sharply contrasts with 
the widely perceived closed style of government that characterised the Ministry of 
Agriculture.  As one senior figure in the FSA has commented: 
 
“Our experience so far is that the powers we have are certainly adequate.  It is the way we use them 
that is critical and the work we and the new ways we find of doing work which has not been done 
before.  The openness agenda was a new approach to that” (Bell, 2003) 
 
It involves the efforts of the FSA to change existing relationships, such as the food 
enforcement activities of local government, and to engage with stakeholders in a quite 
different way from MAFF.  Patterns of food governance in Britain, though, have also 
been shaped by a broader restructuring of risk and within the food sector have 
increasingly involved a European level regulatory dimension (see Smith et al 2004 for 
a much fuller analysis of these trends). 
 
The system of food safety that dominated under MAFF regarded food and agricultural 
production systems as being safe unless proven otherwise by technical and 
quantitative analyses. In this way, government (and the food industry) had a rational 
and scientific basis on which to rest relevant public health and food quality assurance 
                                                                 
1 The research on which this paper is based is funded by the ESRC and we are grateful for its support. 
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policies.  The transformation, since the mid-1980s, in how food risk is perceived and 
the new regulatory framework that has emerged to mediate the new concerns, have 
been traced by Marsden et al. (2000).  In depicting the evolution that was taking place 
in food safety assurance strategies in the UK from the 1980s into 1990s, they pointed 
to a transition from a traditional government-led corporatist regulatory and monitoring 
model (conservative, proof-based approach enforced at the local level by 
Environmental Health and Trading Standards Officers) to a new phase dominated by 
supply-chain management, and food standards strategies, designed and applied by the 
large multiple food retailers.  In this case, food safety issues are perceived by large 
food retailers; the public sector, principally local government is left to act mainly as 
an auditor rather than a standard-setter and enforcer of the mainstream process. 
 
In terms of understanding food safety, the FSA has found itself having to operate with 
classic issues of governance.  The debate about governance is about understanding 
how to steer society towards collective goals, in this case improved food safety.  The 
FSA represents one of the ways in which we are witnessing the wider ‘ho llowing out’ 
of the state since it is the removal of formerly central government responsibilities to a 
Non-Ministerial Department (NPD).  Since the food industry has complex and 
globalised supply chains with sophisticated notions of quality, governments at a 
national and European level have to seek to engage in new forms of intervention to 
retain a regulatory and enforcement role.  In relation to food safety, as in many other 
policy areas, governments cannot simply exercise their authority through traditional 
top-down models.  Long-standing government structures and interventions seem 
anachronistic.  It is no surprise that tensions over the regulation and governance of 
food at a national level have been mirrored at a European level where significant 
moves have taken place to promote consumer interests in policy making with the 
creation of DG SANCO and the formation of a European Food Safety Authority 
(EFSA).  Interestingly in a sign of the changing priorities and the need to assuage 
consumer concerns over food safety EFSA reports to DG SANCO.  Governments 
now face challenges of policy co-ordination and power sharing as more actors engage 
in policy making and implementation.  In other words, the traditional clear divide 
between government and other actors begins to dissolve.  Public policy goals of food 
safety and quality increasingly depend upon the standards promoted in their food 
supply chains by private sector companies.  In a context in which the boundaries 
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between public and private sectors are becoming more blurred than before we are 
interested to critically examine the extent to which the FSA can make a difference to 
the regulation of food in Britain and to understand the ways in which it tries to 
promote regulation through the enforcement activities of local government. 
 
In this paper, we briefly review the background to the formation of the FSA and its 
formal role.  We then describe how the creation of the FSA has changed the 
interrelationships between organisations and how these patterns have shifted the 
nature of food governance in Britain.  To analyse the changing nature of food 
governance two models are outlined; one coercive and the other partnership based.  
An assessment of the extent to which the FSA works with one or other of these models 
is then made by exploring how key FSAs activities, especially its approach to 
enforcement, are shaping its relationships with other organisations and its policy 
outcomes.  The paper draws heavily on material made available by the FSA through 
its website and a set of key person interviews with those with an interest along the 
whole food supply chain. This includes interviews with the leading and second tier 
retailers, food manufacturers, growers and their trade associations. Interviews have 
also included local level food regulators. Food policy is a sensitive issue and so the 
identity of the interviewees is not revealed.  The work on the FSA is part of a wider 
analysis of the restructuring of food regulation, food supply chains and sustainability 
that is taking place at a national and European level (see Smith et al 2004). 
 
Background to the FSA 
 
Food controversies during the 1990s for the most part concerned issues of safety (e.g. 
salmonella, E.coli, BSE) and raised searching questions about the source and method 
of food regulation.  A high point of political and public concern occurred in the late 
1990s, when within the same month (April 1997) eminent commentators were 
reporting for the government on E.coli (The Pennington Group 1997) and for the then 
Labour opposition on a Food Standards Agency (James 1997).  Both reports 
documented the changing nature of food regulation processes, highlighted weaknesses 
in current implementation practices, and pointed to the confusing range of 
responsibilities and professionals invo lved in food regulation.  Both reports concerned 
themselves with a range of food regulators and regulatory activities, and pinpointed 
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the key role of environmental health and trading standards departments in ensuring 
food standards and safety (James 1997, p11). The major change in regulatory 
structures that the outgoing Conservative and incoming Labour governments 
envisaged was the Food Standards Agency (FSA).  The creation of a new body 
(largely) untainted by the food scares of the 1980s and 1990s was widely welcomed.   
 
The Labour Government elected in 1997 published in January of the following year 
(1998) a White Paper (Cm3830) setting our its proposals for the FSA.  The Bill to 
establish the FSA received Royal Assent in November 1999 and became operational 
on 3 April 2000.  The speedy passage of the Bill through a crowded parliamentary 
timetable demonstrated the Government’s commitment to the idea of a new food 
safety agency. 
 
Why establish the FSA? 
 
The Government’s thinking on the FSA largely followed that of the earlier James 
Report.  The White Paper (Cm3830) on the FSA identified three factors that had 
eroded confidence in food safety.  First, there was the conflict of interest within the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) between its responsibilities for 
sponsoring the food and farm industries and ensuring the safety of food.  Critics 
alleged that too often MAFF favoured producer over consumer interests Second, the 
fragmentation of responsibilities for food within government between MAFF and the 
Department of Health was believed to lead to confusion.  Third there was uneven 
enforcement of food law by local government environmental health officers (EHOs).  
For some local authorities food was a high priority but for others it was not. 
 
To address these problems the FSA had transferred to it from MAFF and the 
Department of Health most food safety matters to which were added limited but more 
extensive powers still.  In consequence the FSA does not face the internal tensions that 
so bedevilled MAFF.  The fragmentation of responsibility within central government 
was overcome by transferring most of the staff with food duties from MAFF and the 
Department of Health to the FSA.  The Agency also has responsibility for the Meat 
Hygiene Service, an executive agency.  Moreover, the Agency reports to the 
Department of Health and not Agriculture (now DEFRA) so removing it as far as 
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possible from the latter’s productivist link, and ensuring a single line of command to 
government.  The FSA also oversees enforcement by setting standards and auditing 
local authorities’ compliance with them, so trying to directly tackle the problem of 
uneven enforcement.  On the face of it then the creation of the FSA makes good many 
of the deficiencies that had been identified in the regulation of food. 
 
The FSA’s main objective as set out in the Food Safety Act 1999 is  
 
“to protect public health from risks which may arise in connection with the consumption of food 
(including risks caused by the way in which it is produced or supplied) and otherwise to protect the 
interests of consumers in relation to food”.   
 
Restoring consumer confidence in the safety of food is, therefore, at the heart of the 
Agency.  It is a task that MAFF especially and to a lesser extent the Department of 
Health proved unable to perform (see Barling and Lang 2003).  The Agency has 
marked out its distinctiveness from what has gone before by interpreting its 
responsibility to public health as three core values: 
· To put the consumer first 
· To be open and accessible 
· To be an independent voice 
Whilst these values might have been shared by MAFF its reputation in relation to food 
safety had been so damaged that it could not have credibly promoted them.  As one 
former senior MAFF official put it: 
 
 “the FSA was set up so that we could put the consumer first and part of that structure seems to me … 
that we must keep the food industry at arms length, and we shouldn’t be seen to be associated with them 
because they’re not nice people”. 
 
Formally the key functions of the FSA are to: 
· provide advice to the public and Ministers on food safety from farm to fork, 
food standards and nutrition; 
· protect consumers through effective enforcement; and 
· support consumer choice through effective labelling 
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Below we outline how patterns of governance relate to structures and networks of 
responsibility and how these have changed with the creation of the FSA. 
 
Patterns of governance: structures and networks of accountability and 
responsibility 
 
The two figures below show the difference in organisational lines of responsibility 
and accountability pre and post the creation of the FSA.  It is important to note, 
however, that there has been a broader dynamic of organisational change in food 
management of which the FSA has been a part.  So, Figure 2 does show a changed 
organisational landscape but it is not one that is simply due to the creation of the FSA.  
Amongst the major organisational changes at a national level are the demise of 
MAFF, the creation of the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and the reform of 
LACOTS into LACORS.  The creation of devolved administrations for Scotland and 
Wales have also compounded the sense of organisational change, since they will have 
responsibility for local government within their countries. At a European level too 
there has been organisational change with the development of DG SANCO to 
represent consumer affairs and the creation of the European Food Safety Authority 
(EFSA). 
 
The two figures represent merely the public side of regulation and do not include the 
private supply chain regulation of food that also takes place (see Flynn et al 1999).  
They indicate a dense network of formal relationships that has if anything become 
more complex over time.  In terms of political accountability the FSA in England is 
responsible to Parliament through the Secretary of State for Health.  What is also clear 
is that food remains a policy area with diffused responsibilities.  For example, the 
Agency also has to co-operate on food issues with the DEFRA which has 
responsibility for issues like animal welfare, food labelling, GM foods and animal 
feedingstuffs.  The Department of Health retains responsibility for nutrition (HC 524 
2003, p23), foodborne diseases and the handling of emergencies (HC 524 2003, p26).  
With both Departments the FSA has Framework Agreements to establish the roles and 
responsibilities of the different bodies.  In its role as a Non-Ministerial Department 
the FSA negotiates in EU on behalf of the UK government and then leads on the 
implementation of EU food law in the UK. 
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Figure 1 The structure of food regulation – pre FSA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
DoE is the Department of the Environment 
DETR is the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions 
MAFF is the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
LACOTS is Local Authority Committee on Trading Standards 
 
 
As a body largely created from the staff and food standard safety responsibilities of 
MAFF and DoH the FSA is now at the centre of a network of food governance.  But 
what do the changes arising from the creation of the FSA mean in practice?  First, the 
FSA has become the national focal point for food issues.  It is the key intermediary 
between European, national and devolved governments on the one side and local 
government on the other.  What the Figures do not reveal however is that funding for 
local authority food hygiene and standards work remains the responsibility of central 
government.  This key lever for promoting change remains outside of the remit of the 
FSA and as we shall see has important implications for our understanding of food 
governance.  Moreover, central government retains a responsibility for the most 
sensitive food issue (e.g. GMOs). 
 
DG Agriculture, DGXXIV 
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Local government Environmental Health and Trading Standards 
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 11 
 
Figure 2 The structure of food regulation in England: the FSA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
The diagram above does not show the impact of the devolved administrations for Wales and Scotland.  
In Wales the Welsh Assembly Government and in Scotland the Scottish Executive will play the part of 
the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister. 
 
The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) was created in May 2002 
DoH is Department of Health 
DEFRA is Department of Food and Rural Affairs 
LACORS is Local Authority Co-ordinators of Regulatory Services 
 
 
Second, at a national level the likely overlap between the functions of LACOTS and 
the FSA in relation to promoting good practice and consistent enforcement practices 
seems to have been resolved.  LACOTS which changed its name in April 2000 to 
LACORS (Local Authorities Co-ordinators of Regulatory Services) are bodies created 
by the Local Government Associations to co-ordinate local government activities.  
Pre-FSA, LACOTS performed a number of food law roles such as an interpreter of 
law, communicator between central and local government and general trouble-
shooter.  It also issued guidance notes to local authorities, participated in consultation 
with government and industry, co-ordinated operational practices of authorities and 
ensured revised patterns of enforcement, often arising from EC membership, were 
effective.  In short, it sought to achieve greater consistency in local government 
European Union 
DG SANCO, European Food 
Safety Authority 
Office of the 
Deputy PM 
DoH DEFRA (e.g. 
GMOs) 
FSA 
Local government Environmental Health and Trading Standards 
Departments 
LACORS 
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enforcement practice.  Given that these functions were given to the FSA, it is 
necessary to consider what role LACOTS had after the creation of the FSA in April 
2000.  The possibility of overlap of functions was addressed in a Concordat between 
the FSA and LACOTS, which sets out the framework for co-operation between the 
bodies. 
 
Nevertheless the question remains, why was LACOTS not dissolved upon the creation 
of the Agency in order to avoid duplication of efforts?  The answer is that the FSA 
and LACORS are creatures of different levels of government.  LACORS is a 
representative body of local government and therefore seeks to protect and promote 
local government activities.  The FSA was a creation of national government and 
although it has very close relations with local government it is not part of local 
government and will not always share its agenda and therefore a role remains for a 
body such as LACORS. 
 
Third, that there is a role for LACORS alongside the FSA illustrates how complex 
patterns of food governance can emerge.  Indeed, Figures 1 and 2 present a much 
simplified picture of food governance. Although the FSA is the pre-eminent food 
regulatory body a number of other bodies have food enforcement responsibilities 
(FSA 2002, p3): 
· Meat Hygiene Service – responsible for enforcing legislation in 
slaughterhouses and cutting plants.  This is an executive agency that reports to the 
FSA. 
· Horticultural Marketing Inspectorate – responsible for checking the quality of 
fruit and vegetables in the UK 
· Dairy Hygiene Inspectorate – responsible for checking standards at milk 
production holdings 
· Egg Marketing Inspectorate – responsible for checking standards in egg 
production, packing and distribution centres 
· Wine Standards Board – responsible for monitoring standards in wine making 
· Port Health Authorities and Border Inspection Posts – responsible for 
checking food imports and products of animal origin.  These can only enter the 
UK through authorised Border Inspection Posts. 
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Apart from the Meat Hygiene Service the other bodies are in large part independent of 
the FSA, though Port Health Authorities and Border Inspection Posts fall within the 
FSAs inspection remit. 
 
Two sets of questions that immediately raise themselves are, why when the FSA was 
created was the opportunity not taken to engage in further organisational 
rationalisation?  In other words, why not create a single, integrated food regulator?  
The second set of questions relates to how these different organisations share 
responsibility for food regulation, how do they ensure consistency?  How do they 
overcome organisational competition?  Do they share a common agenda on 
enforcement?  And what difference, if any does it make to those that they regulate?  
To begin to understand these questions means recognising the complex and dense 
organisational networks that help to make up food governance in Britain. 
 
Food governance 
 
Understanding governance and assessing its implications for the government of the 
state and society at a time of new and changing internal and external constraints itself 
remains contested.  Berger (2003) has distinguished five different approaches to 
governance and it is worth following these through to identify what they mean for the 
Food Standards Agency and food governance in Britain. 
 
First there is governance as networks.  This is probably the most prominent approach 
to current debates on governance.  Networks are used to describe the different social 
actors structures and interactions involved in negotiating and delivering policies.  
Governance is about managing these networks in different policy fields.  Of course, 
government has always had to deal with different actors in developing and delivering 
policy but what is new is the limited control that government has over these actors or 
networks, mainly because of a lack of legitimacy and the complexity of the policy 
process.  As one of the leading advocates of the network approach, Rhodes (1996, 
p660) has pointed out governance refers to self-organising, inter-organisational 
networks with characteristics like interdependence between societal actors, continuing 
interactions between network members and a significant autonomy from the state.  
The management of food can easily be situated within a network perspective.  From 
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the late 1980s government has lost legitimacy in food policy and has had to deal with 
an increasingly complex policy environment.  On the one side the EU has been a key 
driver for new policy and on the other the corporate private sector has helped to 
deliver on public policy goals relating to food standards and choice.  The FSA has 
developed its own network of actors that includes all parts of the food supply chain as 
well as parts of local and central government and the EU. 
 
A second approach is governance as the inclusion of wider parts of society.  The 
approach also recognises that policy outcomes are not the product of actions by 
government alone.  With the increasing complexities and specialisation of society, no 
single actor – public or private – has all the knowledge, information or resources 
required to solve problems.  Moreover, an ever more knowledgeable and interested 
(or is it sceptical and suspicious) public demands a greater inclusion in the policy 
making process.  The task of government is to enable wider socio-political 
interactions and so will entail notions of capacity building, inclusion and 
participation.  Again, it is easy to see how the creation of the FSA ‘fits’ into this 
perspective on governance.  Government, specifically the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food, was widely perceived to be part of the food problem, that is of 
public concern over the safety of food.  The FSA was in part created to assuage that 
concern and much has been made of its independence from government.  The FSA is 
structured so that it can take account of a wide range of interests within the food 
system and has prided itself on its inclusivity and approach to participation in its 
practices. 
 
Governance as multi- level government is a third approach.  This form of governance 
implies the stronger inclusion of all tiers of government – with a special emphasis on 
the regional and local levels – in the design, formulation and implementation of policy 
making.  Each step of the policy making process should be carried out at the 
appropriate level and so this approach has strong links to debates on subsidiarity.  In 
terms of understanding food governance this approach too has some merit.  The FSA 
has to engage with European and national governments when contributing to policy 
making and the interpretation of regulation and with local government when 
implementing policy. 
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A fourth perspective is governance as the new public management.  This approach to 
governance is linked to discourses of efficiency and effectiveness and borrows 
heavily from a market rhetoric.  Within public policy this suggests the introduction of 
private sector management methods to the public sector and incentive structures such 
as market competition into public service provision (Rhodes 1996, p665).  It also 
leads to the development of targets and indicators that have a market base (e.g. the 
efficiency of aspects of service provision). Interestingly, in its examination of the 
performance of the FSA, the National Audit Office (NAO) adopted a wide-ranging 
approach, going well beyond a traditional efficiency or effectiveness study to embrace 
how the FSA made decisions, assessed risks and was recognised by the public as a 
source of authoritative advice (see HC 524 2003, p20-53). 
 
A fifth view is governance as hierarchies.  This refers to the fact that although there 
has been much interest in the horizontalisation of institutions and actors hierarchies or 
vertical relationships continue to play an important part in political life.  For the FSA 
vertical relationships and the patterns of power that go with it are part and parcel of its 
everyday life.  For example, EU directives and regulations come down to the member 
states and must be complied with.  Similarly the FSA will at times seek to invoke its 
power and authority over local government. 
 
Governance is not only about structures and institutions but also actors, processes and 
outcomes.  It is important to understand the interactions and networks that exist 
between structures.  One way of seeking to understand the interactions between 
institutions, actors processes and how this may produce different outcomes is to 
develop two ideal types of food governance in Britain and then explore them for the 
activities of the FSA. 
 
From the perspective of governance a key research question is, what difference does 
the FSA make to the management of food in Britain?  In answering this question we 
need to be able to establish the relationships in which the FSA engages.  As Figure 2 
above shows the FSA is likely to be involved in a set of hierarchical rather than 
vertical relationships.  Does the FSA seek to coerce local authorities or work in 
partnership with them?  Or does the FSA seek to establish a more variable geometry 
of relationships with local government in which it works with both coercive and 
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partnership models of governance?  What are the resources that the FSA can bring to 
the networks in which it operates to try and promote its agenda? 
 
In Table 1 below we outline an ideal-type model of coercive and partnership-based 
multi- level governance.  The features in the ideal type draw on some of the themes 
identified by May et al (1996) in their study of co-operative and coercive 
environmental intergovernmentalism.   
 
Table 1  Ideal types of food governance 
 
Feature Coercive  Partnership 
Targets Set from centre, prescriptive Agreed by consent 
Means to achieve goals  Hold to account and audit, rule 
bound relationships 
Educate and spread knowledge 
Accountable to Higher level of government Public, stakeholder groups and 
government 
Agendas Likely to be different agendas 
held by different actors 
Seek shared agenda 
Lower level autonomy  Minimise local discretion  Accept local discretion and 
autonomy 
knowledge Concentrated at the centre and 
to be dispersed from the centre 
outwards 
Knowledge diffused and seek 
means to utilise local knowledge 
Openness Limited and to favoured few Consultative and participatory 
Views of lower tier of 
government 
hierarchy Partner in policy delivery 
Funding Ring fence budgets  Budgets determined according 
to local priorities within a 
common agenda 
Policy outcomes Seek uniformity around a 
baseline because monitoring for 
compliance with targets 
Accept variability above 
baseline because seeking 
improvements in practice and 
spreading knowledge 
 
The model is not suggesting that organisations will engage in either co-operative or 
coercive relationships since the features of the models are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive.  Nevertheless some of the features are likely to reinforce one another.  For 
instance, the way in which an organisation seeks to achieve its goals should be closely 
associated with who it is held accountable to.  Within the coercive model the rule 
bound nature of relationships is likely to result in a narrow perspective on 
accountability to government in which performance is measured in financial or 
political terms.  A partnership model of governance will have both more complex sets 
of relationships by which to achieve goals and also for establishing and reporting on 
the accountability of an organisation.  So when analysing the impact of the FSA on 
 17 
food governance although we can pay more attention to some features than others the 
features themselves do run into one another. 
 
A good starting point is to establish the autonomy and accountability of the FSA.  
This will help to establish the independence of the FSA and its stakeholders.  Is the 
FSA simply a tool of central government or an independent actor?  We then go on to 
analyse the agenda of the FSA.  What does it do and how much of what it does is 
driven by the EU and how much by a domestic agenda?  With the FSA responsible for 
food safety in Britain, and given Britain’s track record on food safety, does the FSA 
feel under additional pressure to comply with European demands?  If the FSA does 
feel such pressures does it mean that it more likely to adopt a coercive approach in its 
dealings with local government to secure compliance? 
 
Independence and Accountability of the FSA 
 
Independence 
 
Independence from government consists of at least two features.  One is the funding of 
the Agency, is it dependent on government for its money or not?  If it is dependent on 
government is it likely to feel compromised in cha llenging government?  A second 
feature follows on from the first and concerns the remit of the FSA and its freedom to 
act without the sanction of government. 
 
· Funding 
 
Perhaps the most controversial issue surrounding the formation of the FSA related to 
its funding.  The Government initially proposed that all food premises should pay a 
£90 annual levy to fund the Agency’s start up and running costs.  Not surprisingly the 
food retail industry strongly opposed paying for the Agency either arguing that it 
should not have to pay for its own watchdog  - calling it a “poll tax on food” - or that a 
more equitable system of sliding payments based on the size of the firm should be 
introduced.  Although in the early part of 1999 the Government had strongly defended 
its intended fee on food premises, by June it had agreed that cost of the Agency would 
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be absorbed into general taxation.  As the Minister of Agriculture, Nick Brown, 
explained  
 
“There were a lot of representations made to us against the idea of a flat rate levy.  Representations 
were particularly strong from those who represent small shops, village shops and rural communities, 
and on consideration the government has decided to abandon the idea.”  (Brown 1999)  
 
Brown’s comments indicate that the Government’s approach to food ran into a rather 
different agenda, that of its rural policy where the Government had felt rather exposed 
to claims that it did not fully appreciate rural life. 
 
· Action 
 
With one exception, there is very little to indicate that relations between the FSA and 
government have been anything other than cordial.  The FSA has not appeared to feel 
hamstrung by government or that it has needed additional powers to guarantee its 
independence (see HC 708).  The one public source of tension between Go vernment 
and Agency has actually seen the Agency successfully asserting its independence in 
relations to its position on GM foods. 
 
A report in the Guardian (7 December 2002) claimed that in an exchange of letters 
between the Chair of the FSA, Sir John Krebs, and the then Environment Minister, 
Michael Meacher, the latter had asked the Agency to be more supportive over the 
potential benefits of organic foods over conventional foods.  However, the Agency’s 
line is that based on current research there are no significant differences on safety and 
nutrition between the two types of food.  The dispute arose after Meacher, who 
chaired a government advisory group, produced an action plan to boost organic 
farming.  It was endorsed by Margaret Beckett, the Environment Secretary, who said 
organic farming and food offered 
  
“real benefits for the environment”.   
 
Mr Meacher wrote to Sir John in October asking whether the Agency could make 
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 “a positive but factual statement on the pesticide, additive, GM and regulatory assurance benefits that 
are associated with organic food”.  
 
 Mr Meacher said:  
 
“I do appreciate the FSA would not wish to see any words not based on scientific evidence.  However, 
it is a fact that organic food production uses a much narrower range of pesticides and additives than 
conventional farming, eschews GMOs, and that there are environmental benefits.  I would hope that it 
would be possible for FSA to acknowledge these points as a matter of consumer information for those 
who wish to choose food produced by organic methods.” 
 
Sir John replied that  
 
“the agency's position on organic food is that it is not significantly different in terms of food safety and 
nutrition from food produced conventionally”. 
 
 He pointed out that the Agency had no remit on environmental matters.  He 
continued,  
 
“The organic action plan team invited the agency to make a positive factual statement about organic 
food in order to help organic producers sell more of it. Our independence of industry interest is of 
paramount importance to us. Only by maintaining this can we operate credibly in the consumer 
interest.  I am sure, therefore, that you will understand that it would be inappropriate for the agency to 
make statements supporting any particular food promotion scheme.” 
 
The spat between Krebs and Meacher is illustrative of the disputes that are often 
hidden behind the closed doors of Whitehall.  Here the FSA has not played according 
to a Whitehall rule, that is of supporting government policy when invited to do so.  
Professionals in other parts of government have often had to defend their integrity in 
the face of pressure to be more sympathetic to policy than they believe is justified.  So 
such disputes over evidence are not new.  What is rather novel is that the dispute 
became public knowledge.  This raises the question of whether the outcome would 
have been the same (i.e. a refusal to endorse organic food) if food responsibilities had 
remained in central government?  Here the operation of government would surely 
have produced a different outcome as Beckett and Meacher had made a policy and 
political decision in support of organic farming.  At a minimum it is likely to have led 
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a minister in one department to have a word with another to remind them of the need 
for government unity. 
 
Accountability 
 
Although the creation of the FSA has been well received by all sections of the food 
system, it has not been without controversy.  The James Report had recommended that 
the Agency (or as it called it a Commission) should be dominated by consumer and 
public interests.  This was presumably in the belief that such people would hold the 
Agency staff to account.  The Government was rather more wary and proposed that it 
should consist of individuals with a  
 
“proven track record in relevant fields”,  
 
with a majority coming from a  
 
“wider public interest background without any specific affiliation”.   
 
So whilst there are members of the Agency Board with a background or longstanding 
interests in consumerism it does reflect a broader range of food and scientific 
perspectives.  From the perspective of one senior ex-MAFF official there is the view 
that relationships with the food industry have changed: 
 
“I think the interactions are different, my impression is that they are not close or cordial, the 
impression I get from talking to people who are in the food industry, the good relationship that we [in 
MAFF] had with them are now harder to form with the FSA.  On the Board of the FSA there is only 
limited food producer representation.  The emphasis is to put the consumer first…” (interview) 
 
Whilst the FSA Board2 has a different mix with more economic interests and fewer 
consumer representatives than James may have wished to see, it is a moot point as to 
                                                                 
2 The Agency has a Chairman, Deputy Chairman and 8-12 other members (one of which is appointed by the National Assembly 
of Wales, two by the Scottish Ministers and one by the Department of Health and Social Services for Health the rest of the Board 
members are appointed by the Secretary of State for Health).  The Chairman and the Deputy Chairman are appointed by the 
Secretary of State for Health and his counterparts in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.  The FSA also has a Chief Executive 
who is responsible to the Agency members, for ensuring that the Agency is run efficiently and is responsible to Parliament for 
the way in which the Agency spends its money. Whilst the first appointment was made by central government subsequent 
appointments are made by the Agency subject to the approval of the authorities.  There are also separate directors for Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland, who are responsible under the Chief Executive for the activities of the Agency in Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland. 
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whether or not it has affected its accountability to the public.  The Agency has from 
the outset sought to engage with a wider set of interests than MAFF and to report 
widely on its activities.  Positioned as the consumer’s champion on food matters, the 
FSA’s credibility lies in its transparency, openness and accountability.  This is 
supported by the requirement under s.4 of the Act for the FSA to prepare a public 
report on its activities and performance during each financial year.  Moreover, as a 
public body anyone aggrieved by a decision the FSA makes may seek judicial review 
of that decision.  As a public body the FSA is also formally accountable for its 
activities to the Secretary of State for Health and to Parliament for the way in which it 
spends its money.  The Agency’s spending and activities are scrutinised by the 
National Audit Office whose reports are passed to the House of Commons Public 
Accounts Committee (the first reports on the FSA were published in 2003, see HC 
524 and HC 708). 
 
The FSA agenda and its activities 
 
The James Report (1997) had wanted the Agency to promote food safety “from 
plough to plate”.  In the consultation on the FSA some environmental and consumer 
groups argued that the FSAs agenda should extend to issues such as animal welfare 
and the environmental impacts of farming.  The Government opted for a narrower 
mandate.  It argued that giving the Agency  
 
“operational responsibility for all aspects of farming practices would risk diverting it from its essential 
aim of protecting public health.”  
 
 Instead, it wanted to put the Agency in a position where it would be able to 
“intervene” where farming practices have an impact on food safety.  However, as the 
ENDS Report (No 276) pointed out the FSA’s proposed intervention powers appear to 
be very much reactive, being essentially restricted to controlling the entry of materials 
into the human food chain.  Central government (i.e. DEFRA) retains responsibility 
for farming practices. 
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A useful window on the activities of the FSA is provided by an analysis of the 
consultation documents on its website.  From the consultation process it is possible to 
identify: 
· The source of the consultation (i.e. what has driven it) 
· The division within the FSA that is responsible for the consultation 
 
The information provided on these two issues will indicate on which side of a 
continuum the FSA can be placed.  At one end is the FSA acting largely as a postbox 
in that it mainly responds to an EU agenda.  Brussels drives much food policy and one 
line of thinking would be that the FSA workload is largely a response to a European 
agenda.  It passes information on current and upcoming European issues to a domestic 
audience and then feeds those responses back to Brussels.  At the other end of the 
continuum it maybe that the FSA has developed its own domestic agenda and is 
seeking to promote it.  After all the FSA was largely a response to domestic food 
crises.  Either end of the continuum can be represented by different arguments.  
Briefly the former would suggest that the FSA is an organisational fix, changing little; 
the latter would contend that the FSA is a more substantial reform changing the 
regulatory politics of food.  Data on the divisions within the FSA that are responsible 
for most consultations will provide an indication, from an FSA perspective, of the 
most topical food issues. 
 
Below we analyse by year of start date FSA consultations since the summer of 2001 
until the end of 2003. 
 
UK consultations for 2001 
 
Source of consultation 
UK EU  Codex 
8 4 6 
 
Subject of consultation 
Labelling Meat hygiene Food Chain  
Strategy  
Animal 
feed 
Additives Novel 
foods 
Radiological 
Safety 
Microbiological 
safety 
Unknown 
7 + (1) (1) (3) 1  1 1 + (1) (1) (1) 
 
Numbers in brackets refer to domestic source of consultation 
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2001 is the first year for which figures on consultations are available and are only for 
part of the year.  The figures on the number of consultations are thus lower than for 
successive years and so not too much can be read into them.  Domestic issues, though, 
show themselves to be twice as important a source of consultation than those from the 
EU.  In its early life it is important for the FSA to establish its profile amongst key 
actors in the UK and so, perhaps, not surprisingly domestic issues and stakeholders 
are to the fore. 
 
Within the FSA the work of the Food Chain Strategy Division was the main area of 
domestic work and it dealt with FSA response to the Policy Commission on Farming 
and Food for England and contributed to an FSA Task Force on the Burdens of Food 
Regulation on Small Food Businesses.  The other notable feature of the table on the 
subject of consultation is that it is dominated by labelling issues. 
 
UK consultations for 2002 
 
Source of consultation 
UK EU  Codex 
15 12 5 
 
Subject of consultation 
Labelling Meat hygiene Food Chain  
Strat egy  
Animal 
feed 
Additives Novel 
foods 
Radiological 
Safety 
Microbiological 
safety 
Unknown/ 
misc 
8 + (5) 1 + (4)  3 1 1  1 + (1) 2 + (5) 
 
Numbers in brackets refer to domestic source of consultation 
 
As is to be expected during a full year the number of consultations increases on 2001.  
Once again in 2002, UK issues are the most important source for consultation 
exercises, though EU issues closely follow them.  Labelling issues are the most 
important topic for UK consultation issues, and they are also the subject of most of 
the Codex consultations.  Labelling dominates the FSA agenda with a total of 13 
different consultations with meat hygiene the subject of five consultations the next 
most popular topic. 
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UK consultations for 2003 
 
Source of consultation 
UK EU  Codex 
1 2 1 
 
Subject of consultation 
Labelling Meat hygiene Animal feed Additives 
1 1 + (1) 1  
 
Number in brackets refers to domestic source of consultation 
 
England only consultations 
 
Source of consultation 
UK EU  Codex 
1 9 1 
 
 
Subject of consultation 
Labelling Meat Hygiene Chemical Contaminants and 
Animal Feed 
Additives Unfit meat 
5 (1) 3 1 1 
 
Numbers in brackets refer to domestic sources of consultation 
 
Comment 
 
For 2003 the consultations show a marked swing to the EU as the most important 
source3.  This trend would seem to indicate that the period following the EU white 
paper on food safety is leading to a lot of legislative and consultative activity within 
Member States.  In terms of the subject of food consultations food labelling and 
standards remains the most important topic. 
 
                                                                 
3 For 2001 and 2002 the results are for UK consultations whereas for 2003 the FSA reports on consultations that refer to UK-
wide food resp onsibilities and those where responsibilities can be dealt with by consultations in the devolved nations  For ease of 
analysis only the results for England are reported here. 
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What do these results indicate about the nature of food governance?  First, the EU is a 
key source for consultation and one that appears to be becoming increasingly 
significant over time.  Codex too is making its mark on FSA consultations.  Together 
these two non-national sources of consultation account for more sources of 
consultation than domestically driven consultation exercises.  In terms of its 
consultative activities the FSA is an integral part of a system of mult- level food 
governance.  However, it would be a mistake to simply portray the FSA as simply a 
postbox, or a conduit between international and national stages.  This is because 
second although domestically sourced consultations may be becoming relatively less 
important for the FSA they have helped it to define its position in food regulation.  
For example, the FSA consulted on how it could present a consumer perspective to 
the Curry commission.  Consultations must also have helped the FSA develop 
relationships with key stakeholders.  A consultation exercise on meat hygiene, for 
instance, will be circulated to about 200 groups and organisations.  Whilst it would be 
naïve to equate consultation with partnership in terms of governance it does mark a 
more inclusive approach than had previously prevailed (interview with consumer 
organisation). 
 
Enforcement strategy 
 
Analysis of consultations provides an insight into the agenda for food management at 
a national and international level.  It does not, however, tell us anything about how the 
FSA is allocating its resources.  Information on the internal resource allocation of the 
FSA provided in Table 2 below indicates something of a mismatch with the results 
arising from the consultation strategy. 
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Table 2  FSA Proposed Thematic Expenditure 2002-03 
Task  % 
Food safety: BSE 27 
Food safety: Food Products and Processes  13 
Food Safety: Foodborne Illness 12 
Food Safety: Chemical Safety of Food 11 
Nutrition and Diet 10 
Consumer Confidence 8 
Developing Staff 5 
Food Law and Enforcement 5 
Other 5 
Public Information, Labelling and Choice 4 
Total Expenditure £97m 
 
Source FSA 2002, p11 
 
Perhaps the two most notable features of the pie chart are: 
1. That so much resourcing is devoted to BSE (it was the subject of only one 
consultation paper) 
2. That so little resource is devoted to food law enforcement 
 
The limited resourcing of food law enforcement is revealing of the nature of 
governance relationships and responsibilities.  On the one side improving food 
enforcement is a key task for the Agency but on the other it lacks a key lever, namely 
control of funding for that task which is undertaken by local government.  Here the 
FSA faces one of the classic challenges of governance: how can it steer others to 
achieve its own policy goals? 
 
Lax enforcement of food law is perceived by the FSA and other commentators to have 
been a key factor in the number of food borne illnesses in the UK.  An improvement 
in food law enforcement is a key priority of the Agency’s strategic plan for 2001-6, 
and would mark an important break with the past.  The assumption is that more 
effective enforcement will raise standards in food businesses and thus improve the 
safety of food that people eat and this will help to meet the Agency’s strategic aim of 
reducing food borne illnesses by 20% by 2006. (FSA 2002a, para 2.4). 
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Some idea of the scale of the regulatory challenge can be gauged by assessing the 
structure of food businesses. There are about 600,000 food businesses in the UK of 
which: 
· 372,000 (62%) are caterers 
· 186,000 (31%) are retailers, and  
· 18,000 (3%) are food manufacturers 
 
FSA Enforcement activities 
 
Food enforcement work is shared between the FSA and local government.  The FSA 
is consistent in its message that it is working with local government to promote better 
food standards.  Local authorities are the frontline, the primary food enforcement 
body at the local level; the FSA is responsible for the development of food 
enforcement policy and support functions for local government.  The Food Standards 
Act 1999 provides the FSA with a package of statutory powers to strengthen its 
influence over enforcement activity (FSA 2002b, p3).  The Act gives the Agency 
powers to: 
· Set standards of performance in relation to the enforcement of food law 
· Monitor and audit the performance of local government 
· Require information from local authorities relating to food law enforcement 
and inspect any records 
· Enter local government premises to inspect records and take samples 
· Publish information on the performance of local government 
· Make reports to individual local authorities, including guidance on improving 
performance 
· Require local government to publish these reports and state what action they 
will take as a response. 
 
These powers appear to be wide-ranging and interventionist.  They also fit well in a 
coercive model of governance with the emphasis on inspection, audit, standard setting 
and monitoring.  Whilst the powers are significant they do not in themselves provide 
the levers to make local authorities single-mindedly pursue an FSA agenda.  Powers 
to influence local government agendas remain well outside the remit of the FSA, for 
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example in the hands of the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and the devolved 
administrations.  So a potentially coercive style of governance has to be nuanced by 
the FSA: the Agency can hector and cajole but it would find it difficult to coerce local 
government.  Even where the FSA may be able to act in a more coercive style through 
its audit powers it finds them potentially undermined by the actions of the Audit 
Commission which has its own food enforcement performance indicators and which 
is accorded a higher priority in local government than the FSA (local government 
interview). 
 
The FSA enforcement agenda 
 
The FSA recognises that the effectiveness of food law depends on how well it is 
enforced.   
 
“[A] key role for the Agency is to work with local authorities to ensure the effectiveness of UK food 
law enforcement” (FSA 2002b, p6).   
 
The FSA will do this by (FSA 2002b, p6): 
· Providing guidance and support for local enforcement staff 
· Ensuring proportionate and more consistent enforcement 
· Providing more information about standards of food safety 
· Improving the transparency of enforcement arrangements for stakeholders 
· Promoting the  wider implementation of risk-based systems for improving 
safety standards across the food chain. 
 
Key features of the model for improving local enforcement are that first it is 
partnership based – local government is to be guided and supported.  This would seem 
to be partly a result of the philosophy of governance that promotes partnership as a 
preferred way of working but also partly recognition of the limitations of FSA powers 
over local government.  It has very limited authority to dictate to local government 
and a dictatorial stance might lead to a breakdown in relations with local government 
and undermine the FSA’s enforcement strategy. Second, the FSA is keen to promote 
consistent and transparent enforcement by local government.  Here a more coercive 
model of relations between the FSA and local government is implied.  Consistency 
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and proportionality in enforcement activity will mean that decisions are not made 
according to local circumstances but by centrally based (and probably centrally 
developed) criteria.  An indicator of the Agency’s thinking is the comment that: 
 
“One key area of the Agency’s work has been to strengthen links with LAs.  To help achieve this a 
Framework Agreement on Local Authority Food Law Enforcement was developed with a joint 
Government/local authority group (the Local Authority Enforcement Liaison Group).  The Framework 
Agreement includes the standards and arrangements through which the Agency sets, monitors and 
audits local enforcement services” (FSA 2002b, p6). 
 
This would seem to undermine the local discretion implicit within a partnership 
model.  Third, the approach is typical of the rational model of decision making with 
the belief that providing actors with information on their performance will make them 
better informed and so willing to improve their performance.  Such a belief, however, 
tends to ignore the realities of enforcement activity where actors find themselves 
confronted by competing demands for their time and resources and where local 
politics may play a big part in their activities – all often undermine a rational mode of 
behaviour.  
 
The Framework Agreement on Food Law came into force on 1 April 2001 and is but 
one of a number of such agreements that have been negotiated between the Local 
Government Association (or the Welsh Local Government Association) and 
government and its agencies across the range of local governments work.  The 
Framework was developed through the Local Authority Enforcement Liaison Group 
(now the Enforcement Liaison Group).  Typically Framework documents set out the 
responsibilities of the different actors and the expectations that they may have of each 
other’s performance.  For central government the Framework Agreements are a means 
of trying to ensure that local government shares its agenda and policy priorities.  In 
other words, they are a mechanism for trying to overcome the diversity of local 
government by promoting greater consistency in its behaviour.  So, the Framework 
Agreement on Food Law does not provide for any new powers or resources for local 
government or the FSA but in one document makes clear FSA expectations of local 
authority responsibilities for food law enforcement. It thus provides the Agency with 
a mechanism for implementing its powers under the Food Standards Act to influence 
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and oversee local authority enforcement activity. The Agreement applies to local 
enforcement of all food laws, and incorporates the latest guidance and standards on 
food law enforcement. 
 
The Agreement provides for: 
· Publicly available local service plans to increase transparency of local 
enforcement services 
· Agreed food law enforcement standards for local authorities 
· Enhanced monitoring data with greater focus on inspection outcomes and which 
provides more detailed information on local authority performance 
· An audit scheme aimed at securing improvements and sharing good practice. 
 
Another element of the Framework is the demand that local authorities should 
develop Service Plans that outline their food enforcement activities and resourcing 
and these will provide the basis for FSA monitoring and auditing of individual 
authorities.  Service Plans are to be drawn up by officers but should be approved by 
councillors to ensure political buy-in.  Again Service Plans are a typical feature of 
other Framework Agreements. 
 
Promoting greater consistency by local government is one of the key messages 
emerging from the FSA.  A recent initiative has been the production of revised Codes 
of Practice on food enforcement.  The FSA proposes to consolidate in a Code of 
Practice (FSA 2003a) and Practice Guidance (FSA 2003b) the 20 sets of Codes of 
Practice that currently exist.  In its consultation advice on the Code of Practice the 
FSA notes that  
 
“The Codes set out instructions and criteria to which the [food] authority should have regard when 
engaged in the enforcement of food law and are intended to achieve more even standards of 
enforcement by food authorities.”  
 
 It is intended that consistency will emerge through the rationalisation of 
documentation and the simplification of food inspection regimes (FSA 2003c). 
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The FSA, in line with its commitment, to openness and transparency, has made 
available on its website individual local authority enforcement returns (FSA 2002, 
p9).  The information, as we shall see below is a double edged sword.  On the one 
side the FSA appears to hope that exposing instances of poor performance will force 
recalcitrant authorities into line through embarrassment or local political concern.  On 
the other side the data exposes the weakness of local government food enforcement 
activities and so opens up to critical scrutiny the role of the FSA. Whilst the data for 
2000 was produced in early 2002 and that for 2001 in 2003, to date no data has 
appeared on 2002 local government enforcement activities. 
 
Local authority enforcement 
 
The enforcement of food legislation is mainly carried out by of local government 
Environmental Health and Trading Standards Services (so-called enforcement 
authorities) in 499 local authorities.  The food enforcement duties va ry depending on 
the type of local authority: 
· English County Councils are responsible for enforcing food standards (e.g. 
checking food composition, labelling, claims and presentation matters).  This 
work is carried out by Trading Standards Services. 
· English District Councils are responsible for enforcing food hygiene controls 
(e.g. staff hygiene, hygiene structures and equipment, level of hygiene and 
HACCP training, temperature controls etc).  This is carried out by Environmental 
Health Services. 
· Unitary authorities, Metropolitan Borough Councils and London Boroughs are 
responsible for enforcing both food hygiene and food standards. 
 
The statutory Codes of Practice issued under Section 40 of the Food Safety Act 1990 
lay down minimum inspection frequencies for premises according to their risk rating.  
Local authorites should aim to carry out 100% of the inspections due in each of the 
premises risk categories.  For food hygiene these currently are: 
Category A – at least every 6 months 
Category B – at least every year 
Category C – at least every 18 months 
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Category D – at least every 2 years 
Category E – at least every 3 years 
Category F – at least every 5 years 
 
Minimum frequencies for food standards inspections currently are: 
High risk – at least once every year 
Medium risk – at least once every two years 
Low risk – at least once every five years 
 
Analysis of authorities reporting at least 100% of programmed inspections for 
premises risk rated Category A for food hygiene and high risk for food stands reveals 
considerable variation in performance by local authorities (FSA 2002, p14-5).  First, 
the figures show that food standards inspections (i.e. the TSO role) are achieving a 
consistently better performance than the food hygiene work (i.e. the EHO role).  For 
instance Welsh unitary authorities are amongst the worst performers (only 1 authority 
met the 100% target) in meeting their food hygiene targets but achieve the highest 
percentage (41%) for inspection of high risk premises.  This may in part reflect the 
greater professional standing of TSOs compared to EHOs and/or greater ring fencing 
of the budgets of the former.  Second, that for some types of authority (e.g. Welsh 
unitary, English district councils for food hygiene and the London Boroughs for food 
standards) there is a higher rate of inspection activity across lower rated risk premises 
for their food hygiene and food standards work (FSA 2002b, p16-17).  The FSA does 
not have a full explanation as to why some types of local authority should focus their 
efforts on lower risk rated premises but dryly notes  
 
“as a national statistic it is of concern” (FSA 2002b, p16).   
 
The implication is, of course, that when one activity measure is number of visits to 
food premises, and departments are perhaps under-resourced and under-staffed, that 
they concentrate on the less demanding low risk premises.  Third, there is 
considerable variability in levels of enforcement activity.  Metropolitan councils are 
the most active in taking enforcement action and district councils the least active.  
There is also a large degree of variation in enforcement action within authorities of 
the same type (FSA 2002b, p18).  Finally, there is also considerable variation in 
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sampling rates both between and within different types of local authority (FSA 2002b, 
p23).  In follow up work with local authorities the FSA reported 
 
 “that there was a tendency for authorities to give much higher status and priority to food premises 
inspection work compared to food sampling.  This may be partly due to inspection work being included 
as an Audit Commission performance indicator, whereas sampling has not” (FSA 2002b, p24).   
 
The message here is simple: local authorities find themselves operating in a complex 
web of relationships and not surprisingly sometimes receive inconsistent messages 
from central government or its agencies.  Local authorities respond to the pressures 
that they regard as most acute and in this case the Audit Commission is regarded as 
more important than the FSA.  It also illustrates the ways in which other agencies, 
who have no obvious food remit, can impinge on the regulation of food. 
 
It is also worth briefly commenting on the data that the FSA utilises for its 
management of local government.  The FSA is required to provide an annual report 
on enforcement activity to the European Commission under Article 14 of the Official 
Control of Foodstuffs Directive 89/397.  It covers basic information relating to the 
enforcement work of local food authorities (e.g. number of businesses, number of 
inspections, formal enforcement and sampling).  For the FSA  
 
“the returns provide a valuable source of data and form the central plank on which the enhanced 
monitoring arrangements implemented as part of the Framework Agreement have been built” (FSA 
2002b, p8).   
 
The use of Commission data to provide monitoring data for the FSA of its local 
authority partners is revealing.  First, it provides an indication of EU influence on 
both the FSA and local government enforcement.  The FSA will be constrained in any 
changes it may wish to make to local government enforcement behaviour because of 
the need to meet the reporting requirements of the Directive.  Moreover, the FSA has 
to rely on management data on the monitoring of local authority performance 
collected for other purposes and which may not always be appropriate for its own 
information needs.  For local government the need to provide data to the Commission 
will presumably help to shape the working lives of its food enforcement staff. 
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What is being achieved? 
 
Key findings arising from the Agency’s enforcement strategy of local authority health 
departments are (FSA 2003d, paras 7-9, 11-13): 
· The total number of inspections and other visits to food premises are lower in 
2001 than in 1999 and 2000.  However, more premises were subject to a full 
inspection in 2001 than was the case in 2000 or 1999. 
· More of the premises visited in 2001 were found to be fully compliant with 
food law than in the two previous years, though the improvement is small.   
 
“This trend would seem to indicate a gradual year on year improvement in food safety standards” 
(FSA 2003d, para 10). 
 
· The number of enforcement actions remained stable.  However, the FSA notes 
approvingly that environmental health departments are making increasing use of 
Improvement Notices (FSA 2003d). 
· The number of prosecutions fell. 
· The number of food samples taken continue to fall and  
 
“is of concern given that the importance of sampling to an effective food law enforcement service” 
(FSA 2003d, para 13). 
 
· There are a small number of local authorities undertaking unacceptably low 
levels of activities. 
 
Why do inconsistencies remain with enforcement? 
 
The FSA has identified what it believes are three key factors that account for poor 
performance of some local authorities.  These are: 
· Local authorities have had to devote resources to dealing with foot and mouth 
disease 
· There are problems with staff retention and recruitment 
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· Software problems have meant that some local authorities could not record 
their enforcement activities. 
 
What is interesting about the FSA analysis is that it points to resource and software 
issues that can be resolved but not to ones of intergovernmentalism that are much 
more challenging.  The FSA response is therefore a classic one of further control and 
management of a problem as it intends to: 
 
· check that poorly performing local authorities do meet their inspection targets 
by subjecting them to an audit. 
· Name (and shame) poor performers are identified on the FSA website (see 
FSA 2003d, Appendix 2).  Public identification it is hoped will allow citizens, 
officers and councillors to find out who the poor performers are and then to put 
pressure on them to improve. 
· Meet with stakeholders to discuss why problems have arisen. 
· Start assessing local authority performance against very limited indicators of 
enforcement activity.  Statutory Codes of Practice require local authorities to have 
a risk based inspection programme with an expectation that all high risk food 
businesses will be visited at least once a year.  Whilst this is the expectation of the 
FSA they have used a measure of under 50% of high risk inspections being carried 
out as a basis for identifying local authorities with  
 
      “clearly unacceptable levels of enforcement” (FSA 2003d, para 19).   
 
The vast majority of local authorities are operating well in advance of these levels.  In 
view of this and to encourage further improvements in local authority performance the 
FSA propose to increase measures of inspection levels by 5% each year for the next 
five years (FSA 2003d, para 19). 
 
There is clearly an implementation deficit between the requirement of at least one 
visit a year to high risk food businesses and what is happening in practice.  It is not 
clear how big the deficit is or whether it is closing.  It is also not clear that simply 
setting more testing targets by which local authorities are assessed as unacceptable 
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performers will lead to an improvement in performance.  This is in large part because 
enforcement seems to be dependent on issues that even the FSA identifies as outside 
of its control.  These include external issues (e.g. FMD) making resource demands on 
local government, different local political priorities (that presumably accept naming 
and shaming and/or an audit by the FSA as an acceptable price to pay), and problems 
with staff recruitment and retention.  As the FSA admits:  
 
“enforcement is a matter which resides with local authorities.  Our power there [for enforcement] 
concerns the audit of local authorities and being able ot say when they need to do more and we will 
help them to do more” (Bell 2003).  
 
(Details of the FSA audits of local food authorities are explained below). 
 
The FSAs commitment to transparency has made clear the extent of the variability in 
local government enforcement activities that have been alluded to over a number of 
years (for example going back to the James report).  Until now though there had been 
little publicly available data on the topic.  Having exposed the variability in 
performance the FSA has the challenge of reducing it.  However, it has only limited 
tools by which to ‘manage’ local government and so overcoming its diversity is going 
to be an issue on which the FSA may find itself in a rather vulnerable position. 
 
Auditing local government 
 
The Agency currently aims to audit 40 local authorities in England each year. Its 
counterparts in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland each operate their own audit 
programmes. An audit programme is published quarterly in advance of the audits. 
Local authorities are selected to represent a cross-section of local authority types, 
geographical location and level of enforcement activity as indicated by quarterly 
monitoring returns. 
 
Audits employ a Pre-visit Questionnaire requesting information from local authorities 
and sent 3 months prior to the on-site audit; an Audit Protocol and Audit Checklists; 
and on-site officer interviews. The on-site visits will typically last 2-3 days and may 
also include visits to local food business. In line with its commitment to openness and 
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transparency, the Agency publishes the reports from these audits, together with the 
local authorities’ action plans to address the recommendations made. In order to 
secure improvement, follow-up action is undertaken by the Agency approximately six 
months after the audit report is published, to assess the progress local authorities have 
made in implementing their action plans.  In some circumstances this will entail a re-
visit to local authorities. In others, correspondence between the Agency and the local 
authority may suffice. Agreed revised action plans are published with the audit 
reports.  The audit regime clearly fits into the coercive style of governance. 
 
Audits may well prove to be a useful way of focussing the minds of local government 
staff on food enforcement.  The audit reports may also be a good way of feeding back 
to individual local authorities good practice in food management.  Audits could thus 
prove to be a useful tool for raising food enforcement standards in local government.  
The problem for the FSA is that if audits and inspections are its key tools of 
management (by coercion) they are unlikely to engender the broader change that it 
wishes to see in commitment to local food enforcement.  This is because it cannot 
offer other coercive tools such as ring fencing funding to support its position.  It 
therefore also has to work with more partnership-based tools such as Framework 
Agreements in the hope that these will raise the profile of food enforcement within 
local government.  In a frank assessment of the difficulties that the FSA faces, one of 
its senior figures, Jon Bell has admitted when questioned by the Commons Public 
Accounts Committee: 
 
“We [the FSA] are very much there supporting the environmental health departments in doing their 
job and if they feel they have inadequate resources to meet the sort of targets we are setting, then we 
are very much there to support them, in making the case to the council for more resource.  At the end of 
the day in the democratic system, the way it is set up, the council has to decide how to apportion its 
resources” (Bell, 2003) 
 
Conclusions: multi-level food governance and the FSA 
 
The FSA operates at a number of levels of government.  Its principal relations with 
local government are to promote highe r and more consistent levels of enforcement; its 
relations with national government are to report on its activities and for its budget; 
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and its relations with the EU are to represent the British position on food safety issues.  
At each of these tiers of government the FSA will be engaging in different types of 
relationship and these different tiers of government will have different expectations of 
the FSA and its activities.  In this paper we have concentrated on exploring the 
patterns of emerging national food governance. 
 
The FSA works with two different models of governance, and seems to vacillate 
between the two.  On the one side it appears to favour a coercive model of governance 
in which it imposes its will on local government.  Here it has the ultimate sanction of 
taking over the food enforcement activities of a local authority.  However, to do so 
would raise at least two problems and may help to explain the apparent reluctance of 
the FSA to intervene when faced with very poor local authority performance.  First, if 
it takes over a food authority it will face the same issues that it has identified as 
contributing to underperformance, such as staff recruitment and retention and which it 
is likely to find equally difficult to solve at a local level.  The second factor to be 
borne in mind, and the other side of the governance spectrum is a partnership model 
that the FSA also wishes to adopt in its dealings with local government.  To take over 
a local authority would undermine the partnership model.  The partnership is 
predicated on consensus and goal sharing. 
 
The irony is that as the FSA makes more information available on the levels of 
performance of local government food enforcement it shows how poor they are and 
then exposes its own weaknesses in raising standards.  One of the key tasks of the 
FSA is to improve on that level of performance, but as Figure 2 above illustrates and 
the discussion of food enforcement shows it lacks crucial levers to exercise power 
over local government. 
 
In its dealings with the EU and central government the FSA is likely to find itself 
experiencing different relationships.  The EU operates by holding lower tiers of 
government and their agencies to account.  Within a federalised system of policy and 
decision making higher levels of government favour target setting as means of getting 
lower tiers of government to meet policy objectives.  At the national level the FSA 
will be held to account by the Treasury to ensure that government is receiving value 
for money for the FSA’s expenditure and by the Department of Health and Parliament 
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for its performance on food issues.  The temptation is, therefore, for the FSA to 
similarly seek to hold local government to account but lacking the authority of the 
European Commission and central government must also work with local government 
to help deliver food enforcement.  The FSA faces particularly acute problems with 
regard to the food enforcement activities of local government and these have 
significant implications for the likely patterns of governance that will emerge.  Both 
in terms of the FSA agenda to promote consistency in local government performance 
and how it is held to account for variation in local government performance by the 
NAO and Public Accounts Committee, local variability is to be discouraged rather 
than celebrated. 
 
In practice, some tiers of government will act in a coercive manner because they are 
able to exercise power, they can impose their views.  Other actors must adopt a 
partnership model because they must work with those who deliver services.  The latter 
model may well be more resource intensive and involve capacity building in lower 
tiers of government which may not be sympathetic to annual reporting and auditing 
where much shorter time horizons come into play.  
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